Introduction
We study the problem of choosing a location for a facility or a public good on a set of locations topologically equivalent to a cycle, on the basis of the preferences of agents over such locations. We assume that each agent has cyclically singlepeaked (and hence single-troughed) preferences. This means here that she has a preferred location; moving the good away from this location in either direction makes her worse off. Due to the structure of the cycle, she also has a worse location; moving the good away from this location in either direction makes her better off. We also assume that preferences are symmetric.
A spatial example of this problem is the choice of the location of a geostationary satellite above the equator. Each satellite user has a preferred location for the satellite and the farther from this point the satellite is located, the worse off she is. Here is now a temporal example. Suppose that the government has to accomplish some task on a yearly basis, for example collecting taxes. Each inhabitant of the country has preferences over dates in the year for this to happen.
Some prefer it to happen during the summer, while they are on vacation, others might prefer it to happen in January, when they are planning their budget for the year. Each has a preferred date and the closer the decided date is from his preferred date, the better off he is.
We wish to identify desirable location or date choice rules. First, it should not be possible to make all agents better off, and at least one of them strictly better off by replacing the chosen location or date by another one. This is the "Pareto-efficiency" requirement. Next, we consider independently two conditions of solidarity among agents when their circumstances change. These conditions ensure that changes affect everyone not responsible for these changes in the same direction. The first one applies to situations where the population of the economy is variable. Introduced by Thomson (1983a Thomson ( , 1983b in the context of bargaining, "population-monotonicity" requires that when new agents arrive or when some agents leave, all the agents present at the beginning and at the end should be affected in the same direction. The second condition, "replacement-domination", applies to situations where the population of the economy is fixed. The changes in the environment are changes in preferences of the agents. It requires that if the preferences of one agent change, all the others should be affected in the same way: either all gain or all lose. Replacementdomination was introduced by Moulin (1987) in the context of binary public decision-making. Both conditions were extensively studied in bargaining theory, coalitional games, social choice theory and the theory of resource allocation.
1
The axiomatic analysis of the choice of a location from a location set was first analyzed on a line. This study was later extended to more complex locations sets like trees, cycles or graphs containing at least one cycle. Pareto-efficiency is usually not restrictive in this class of problems. For example, when the location set is a line interval, over which agents have single-peaked preferences, the Pareto set is the entire segment of locations comprised between the two most extreme peaks. This motivated the study of Pareto-efficiency in conjunction with other axioms.
A first path was explored by Moulin (1980) . He looked for strategy-proof rules, which give agents incentives to truthfully reveal their preferences. He considered the case where the location set is a line interval. Schummer and Vohra (2000) extended this work to the case of trees and graphs containing cycles. On cycles, Schummer and Vohra (2000) obtained a negative result: only dictatorial rules satisfy strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency.
A second approach, pioneered by Thomson (1993) and Ching and Thomson (1999) focuses on solidarity criteria. Like Moulin, they consider the case where the location set is a line interval. Thomson (1993) studied replacementdomination. Ching and Thomson (1999) studied population-monotonicity. Both Thomson (1993) and Ching and Thomson (1997) characterized the following class of rules on the basis of Pareto-efficiency and solidarity. Let a be a fixed point in the line interval. Whenever a is located in the Pareto set, choose this point. Whenever it is not, choose the peak that is the closest to a. This defines a family of "target" rules parameterized by a. Vohra (1998) and Klaus (2002) extended these results to trees, and proved analogous characterizations in this case. The case of cycles (and graphs containing at least one cycle) was left open. 2 Unfortunately, when the location set is a cycle, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of the two solidarity conditions, as we show in Section 3.
The cyclic structure of the preferences and the richness of the domain render Pareto-efficiency and solidarity incompatible. Are these conditions compatible on a smaller domains of cyclically single-peaked preferences? We show that they are, when the domain is sufficiently small. In Section 4, we introduce a class of restricted finite domains of cyclically single-peaked preferences. Each of these domains is obtained by restricting agent's preferred points to lie on a regular polygon inscribed in the circle. We characterize the set of solutions on polygons with three, four and five vertices. Each of the solutions satisfying Paretoefficiency and solidarity has the following interesting feature: it maximizes a certain weak partial order on the Pareto-set. On the hexagon and any higher order regular polygon, we obtain an impossibility. Therefore Pareto-efficiency and solidarity are compatible only on small domains of cyclically single-peaked preferences.
2 Another ramification of this literature was initiated by Miyagawa (1998 Miyagawa ( , 2001 ) and Ehlers (2002 Ehlers ( , 2003 who both considered the location of multiple goods on a line. In the location problem of two goods, they obtained different characterizations of Pareto-efficient and populationmonotonic rules corresponding to different preferences over pairs of locations. Ehlers and Klaus (2001) consider lotteries of locations on an interval. Gordon (2006) studies a model of "public decision", which generalizes all models of location choice, and derives general implications of solidarity conditions.
The Model
The choice of the location of a facility on a location set topologically equivalent to a circle has to be made. In order to keep matters simple and with no loss of generality, let the location set 3 be a circle C in the Euclidean space R 2 . Let d (., .) be the distance along the circle. For all x ∈ C, let σ (x) be the location on C diametrally opposed to x, i.e. the location y that maximizes d (x, y).
Let N be the set of nonnegative integers. Each integer represents an agent.
A population is a non-empty and finite subset M ⊂ N . A preference R on C is a binary relation, that is reflexive, transitive and complete. Let R be the set of all cyclically single-peaked and symmetric preferences. Each such
. Therefore the worst location for preference R is σ (p (R)). Let P be the strict preference relation, and I be the indifference relation associated with preference R.
Within a population M , each agent i ∈ M is equipped with a preference 
Let
We are interested in Pareto-efficient solutions that satisfy in addition a solidarity condition. Such conditions are defined next.
Population-monotonicity
In the variable population model, a solution is denoted by Π and its domain is U.
We search for Pareto-efficient solutions Π : U → C satisfying the solidarity requirement of population-monotonicity. This conditions says that when one agent joins a population, all other agents initially present (whose preferences are kept fixed), should be affected in the same direction. Solution Π satisfies this condition if, for all R M ∈ U, all i ∈ N \ N, and all R i ∈ R, we have, either 
Replacement-domination
In the fixed population model, let N be the fixed population consisting of the 
Full domain
In this section, we describe the structure of the Pareto-set for any profile 
In order to characterize the Pareto-set, we introduce a taxonomy of profiles in U. First, profiles in L (as in "large") are the ones with the highest preference heterogeneity. Let R M ∈ L if it is not possible to find a single half-circle containing all peaks in the profile, i.e. either there are x, y, z such that
z ∈ ]y, σ (y)[. Second, profiles in P (as in "polar") are the ones with polarized preferences. Let R M ∈ P if exactly two preferences are represented in the profile, one the opposite of the other, i.e. there is
Third, profiles in I (as in "interval") are the ones with the lowest heterogeneity
. For all such profile R M , there is at most one such pair (x, z). In particular, the class I contains the subclass of unanimous profiles, such that all agents in the profile share the same preference. Clearly, L, P and I partition U. The following result motivates the above profile taxonomy.
Lemma 1 For all
be the unique pair of locations such that z ∈ [x, σ (x)] , and 
Then no other location even weakly Pareto-
in this case as well.
The Pareto set is therefore a continuum, except for unanimous profiles.
This motivates the search for Pareto-efficient solutions satisfying solidarity conditions. Unfortunately, none exists, as we show next. This result contrasts with the positive results obtained by Thomson (1993) and Ching and Thomson (1997) , when the location set is a line. The proof of this result is deferred to the end of the paper, since it is an implication of a stronger result (Theorem 6). However, as we will show next, these axioms are compatible in smaller domains.
Theorem 1
How small must a domain be for Pareto-efficiency and solidarity to be compatible? Which solutions satisfy these conditions on small domains? Section 4 provides a detailed answer to these two questions.
We end this section by stating a useful property of the Pareto set in this model, which follows directly from the previous definitions. The Pareto set can always be generated by a small sub-profile. 
Lemma 2 For all
R M ∈ U, there exists a subpopulation L ⊆ M such that |L| ≤ 4 and E (R L ) = E (R M ) . When R M ∈ P ∪ I,
The Pareto set
In the particular case where R M ∈ R v , the previous taxonomy can be simplified
, and either (v is even and R
and R M / ∈ P. In this last case, the pair (r, t) is uniquely determined, and from
An implication of population-monotonicity
In Lemma 3, we establish a general implication of Pareto-efficiency and populationmonotonicity on the discrete domains U v . If a solution satisfies populationmonotonicity and Pareto-efficiency, then its restriction to non-polar profiles only depends on the Pareto-set, and satisfies a monotonicity property with re-spect to the Pareto-set. Later, we will prove that for v ∈ {3, 4, 5}, solutions on U v satisfying these conditions exist. For these cases, Lemma 3 describes a feature common to all such solutions. But we will also prove that, for v > 5, no solution on U v satisfies these conditions. For these cases, Lemma 3 is a step towards the impossibility result.
Lemma 3 Suppose that there exists a solution on U v satisfying Pareto-efficiency and population-monotonicity, and let
In particular, R L and R M define the same weak Pareto-domination relation, and we have
Implications of replacement-domination
In Lemma 4 and Theorem 2, we establish general implications of Pareto-efficiency and replacement-domination on the discrete domains R 
, and for all s ∈ Z, and for all profile
Proof. We will prove (i) and (ii), after two preliminary steps.
Step 0 (reduction): 
Step 1:
Step 1: The result is trivially satisfied if r = s, so let us assume r = s. Proof of (ii). We distinguish two cases, depending on whether v is odd or even. Case 1. v ≥ 3 is odd. In this case, there are no profiles in P, so it suffices to prove the claim for profiles in L.
of profiles, a sequence {i (k)} k=1,...,6 of agents, and a sequence
of "replacement preferences". Let R * 0
by replacing the preference of agent i (k) with the preference R * k
is constant.
In particular Φ (R * 0
3 ) ∈ L, we also have by Step 0, Φ (R * 6 The proof is in a number of steps.
Step a: Let R N be any profile, such that there exists r such that that R r , R
. Therefore by Step 1, we have Φ (R N ) I r * r+v/2 x r , that is Φ (R N ) I r x r holds for any such profile R N .
Step b: Let
Step a, we have Φ (R N ) I r x r . Therefore Φ (R N ) I r x r holds for any such profile R N .
Step c: For all r, the set I (r, r + 1) contains at most one element.
Step . This proves that for all r, the set I (r − 1, r, r + 1) is nonempty. By step c, it contains at most one element, therefore it contains exactly one element. Thus for all r, both sets I (r − 1, r) and I (r, r + 1) , which contain I (r − 1, r, r + 1) , are nonempty. By step c, both sets contain a unique element and are equal.
Step e:
If v = 4, the set
Step a, and contains only this element, by step c. If v = 4, it immediately follows from
Step d that the set I (0, ..., v − 1) is a singleton set. Therefore, in all cases, this set contains a unique element. Let x * Φ be this unique element. We now verify that x * Φ satisfies all the desired properties.
Step f: 
The following definition plays a role in the next result and later in the paper. 
. Let us verify that Γ satisfies populationmonotonicity. We distinguish three cases. Let
By Lemma 4, in both cases, Γ ( 
Characterization results
For values v in {3, 4, 5}, solutions satisfying Pareto-efficiency and solidarity exist. We will show that they are all "priority rules", which we introduce next. 
Efficient priority rules
An efficient priority rule selects locations according to a priority ordering over locations, under the constraint of Pareto-efficiency.
A priority ordering is a binary relation over C, that is transitive, irreflexive, asymmetric, and not necessarily complete, i.e. a strict partial order. Let be the corresponding weak partial order such that for all x, y ∈ C, we have
(x y) ⇐⇒ (x y) or (x = y) .
A solution Π on U v is the efficient priority rule associated with the priority 
Condition (1)
For all y ∈ C, the set {z ∈ C : z y} is finite.
Condition (2) For all
, and all y = z ∈ E(R M ), either y z, or z y, or there exists x ∈ E(R M ) such that x y and
Well-defined efficient priority rules are obviously Pareto-efficient. They do not necessarily satisfy solidarity conditions. However, the rest of the analysis demonstrates that Pareto-efficient solutions that satisfy a solidarity condition 7 For example, R * 5 {1,4} is such that R * 5
are necessarily efficient priority rules. Moreover, solidarity imposes constraints on the relative position of the locations with highest priorities. 
The case

Theorem 3 (i) A solution on U 3 satisfies Pareto-efficiency and populationmonotonicity iff it is in {Π δ } δ∈Δ . (ii) A solution on R N 3 satisfies Paretoefficiency and replacement-domination iff it is in {Φ
Proof of (i). Π δ is well-defined, since conditions (1) and (2) 
Since y R s+1,s+2 x holds, the axiom is satisfied. II) Suppose that ω = x, χ = z It remains to show that Π = Π δ . Since v = 3 is odd, there are no profiles
such that x ∈ E (R M ) . By Lemma 3 applied to R {0,1,2} and R M , we have
. Since Π only depends on the Pareto-set
. Since Π and Π δ coincide on any non-unanimous profile, we proved that Π = Π δ .
Proof of (ii)
. Φ δ is well-defined, since conditions (1) and (2) are clearly satisfied, for δ ∈ Δ.
Observe that we also have
profile, the axiom is trivially satisfied. Suppose through the end of the proof that this is not the case, which also implies that (R i , R L ) and (R i , R L ) are not unanimous either. Therefore ω, ω , χ ∈ {x, y, z}. Second, if ω = ω , the axiom is trivially satisfied. Suppose through the end of the proof that ω = ω . This implies in particular that at least one location among ω and ω differs from x. Suppose for example that ω = x. We then have ω ∈ {y, z}, which in turn implies χ = ω. By population-monotonicity, we then have χ R L ω , therefore ω R L ω . If instead we suppose ω = x, we obtain that ω R L ω. In both cases, the axiom is satisfied, which ends the proof. 
The case v = 4
When v = 4, the solutions satisfying the conditions of Pareto-efficiency and population-monotonicity form a unidimensional family of efficient priority rules.
Only four solutions satisfy Pareto-efficiency and replacement-domination. They are also priority rules, associated with priorities selected from the first family.
Let us introduce these families. A priority in the first family is identified with a parameter x ∈ C. For any such x, let s be the unique index in {0, . . . , 3} 
Proof of (i).
Π x is well-defined. Condition (1) is clearly satisfied, for all x ∈ C. Condition (2) is obviously satisfied for all pairs (y, z) that are comparable for the priority x . The only pair that is not necessarily comparable is
. But for all values of x such that this is the case, the location x itself is in the Pareto-set for any profile R M such that E (R M ) contains them both. Moreover x has a higher priority rank than both of these locations for the priority x . Therefore condition (2) holds and Π x is well-defined, for all x ∈ C.
Π x satisfies population-monotonicity. We leave it to the reader to verify that for all x ∈ C, we have
and R i ∈ R 4 . Let χ := Π λ (R M ) and ω := Π λ (R i , R M ) . We will show that population-monotonicity is satisfied, i.e. χ R M ω. As a starting point, observe that if either R M is a unanimous profile, or if χ = ω, the axiom is trivially satisfied. Thus we can restrict attention to the remaining cases. Suppose through the end of the proof that R M is not unanimous, and that χ = ω.
As a consequence, (R i , R M ) is not unanimous either. All remaining cases are such that either (ω = x and χ ∈ {σ s (x) , σ s+1 (x)}) or (ω ∈ {σ s (x) , σ s+1 (x)} and χ ∈ {σ (x) , x}). Let us examine each case. I) Suppose that (ω = x and
x holds, the axiom is satisfied. II) Suppose that (ω = x and χ = σ s (x)).
hold, the axiom is satisfied. IV) Suppose that (ω = σ s+1 (x) and χ = x). Then
holds, the axiom is satisfied.
holds, the axiom is satisfied. We exhausted all possible cases, which ends the proof.
If Π satisfies Pareto-efficiency and population-monotonicity, then, for some x ∈ C, Π is Pareto-equivalent to Π x . Let Π be a solution on U 4 satisfying these two conditions. For all population M , let θ M := Π (R * 4 M ). Let x := θ {0,1,2,3} . Let s be the unique index in {0, . . . , 3} such that x ∈ [c s , c s+1 [ . We now verify that necessarily Π is Pareto-equivalent to Π x . Let R M be a non unanimous profile. We distinguish several cases. Case 1:
. Consider the pro-
. Last, Π and Π x obviously coincide on all unanimous profiles, therefore we have shown that Π is Paretoequivalent to Π x for some x ∈ C.
Proof of (ii). Φ s satisfies replacement-domination. Let s ∈ {0, ..., 3} . The rule Φ s is obviously well-defined and Pareto-efficient. 
The case v = 5
When v = 5, the solutions satisfying the conditions of Pareto-efficiency and population-monotonicity form a five-dimensional family of efficient priority rules.
The solutions that satisfy Pareto-efficiency and replacement-domination form a one-dimensional family of efficient priority rules. As in previous cases, the family of priorities characterizing the second problem is a subset of the family of priorities characterizing the first problem.
Let us introduce these families. A solution in the first family is identified with a parameter λ = (x, a, b, d, e) from a certain subset of C 5 , which we describe next. For all index t ∈ {0, ..., 4} , define the following sets of such vectors. Suppose through the end of the proof that χ = ω.
In conclusion, we proved that Π = Π λ .
Proof of (ii)
. Φ λ is well defined. We already proved that λ satisfies conditions (1) and (2) , for all λ ∈ Λ, in particular for all λ ∈ Λ ∩ .
is satisfied. Suppose through the end of the proof that χ / ∈ {ω, ω }. Since Let Φ be a solution on R N 5 satisfying these two conditions. By Theorem 2, Φ can be extended into a solution on U 5 that satisfies population-monotonicity.
Therefore either there exists λ = (x, a, b, d, e ) ∈ Λ such that Π λ coincides with Φ, which in turn implies Φ = Φ λ . We prove that λ ∈ Λ ∩ . Suppose by con- proves λ ∈ Λ B . In conclusion Φ = Φ λ , for some λ ∈ Λ ∩ . All results on population-monotonicity in the paper were established under the assumption that N is countably infinite. This assumption is convenient in the proofs, but not essential. As long as N contains at least four agents, the results on population-monotonicity are not affected. Proving this requires intermediate results on population-monotonicity in the spirit of Lemma 4 and Theo-rem 2, and long but not difficult proofs. All results on replacement-domination in the paper were established for a fixed population containing at least four agents. For both problems, the case of 3 agents is an open question.
A negative result
Conclusion
We have shown that Pareto-efficiency and solidarity are incompatible in sufficiently rich cyclically single-peaked domains, and have characterized the solutions satisfying these properties for smaller polygon-structured domains. The solutions we characterized have the interesting property that each of them maximizes a certain weak partial order on the Pareto-set. Interestingly, the solutions we obtained also satisfy various appealing conditions, which we did not require. The solutions are all strategy-proof, and even coalition-strategyproof, i.e. no coalition of agents can obtain a strict Pareto-improvement for all of its members by misreporting their preferences. The solutions are also essentially anonymous, i.e. each of them does not depend on agents' labels up to Pareto-indifference
8 . An interesting question concerns solutions satisfying Pareto-efficiency, anonymity, and strategy-proofness (or coalition-strategyproofness) in smaller polygon-structured domains. In particular, how small does such a domain need to be, for these conditions to be compatible? Our results
shows that the threshold polygon order for this problem is equal or larger than 5. How large are the corresponding sets of solutions?
